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THE JURISDICTIONAL "HAZE": AN EXAMINATION OF TRIBAL
COURT CONTEMPT POWERS OVER NON-INDIANS*
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. Two brothers in
Swain County, North Carolina, each fail to pay money judgments
entered against them in two different local courts. Both men are
ordered to appear in court on contempt charges. They hire the same
lawyer and receive identical sentences: thirty days in jail as
punishment for not making the payments, as well as 150-day
imprisonments that can be purged if they meet a payment schedule.
Short tempers run in the family, and both brothers respond to their
sentences by cursing the judge and are summarily prosecuted and
convicted of contempt for their outbursts as well. Their lawyer
counsels the first brother to appeal his convictions because the law is
hazy regarding cases like his but tells the other brother that an appeal
would be futile. At first glance, it would appear as if the attorney
acted negligently toward one of his clients. However, if the first
brother was convicted in the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians'
Tribal Court ("Cherokee Tribal Court") and the other was convicted
in state court and neither brother is Indian, the advice becomes
justifiable, as this Recent Development will explain.
The above scenario raises pressing questions about the extent of
tribal sovereignty in contempt cases in light of Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe,' in which the Supreme Court held that when Indian
tribes acquiesced to the "overriding sovereignty of the United
States," they lost criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.2 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that it is not for the courts,
but for Congress, to confer such jurisdiction.' In the years following
the Oliphant decision, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 19884
changed tribal economies dramatically, drawing waves of non-Indians
* © 2012 Joseph Chilton.
1. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
2. Id. at 210.
3. See id. at 212 (noting that "prevalence of non-Indian crime" on reservations and
the protections of the Indian Civil Rights Act are "considerations for Congress to weigh in
deciding whether Indian tribes should finally be authorized to try non-Indians").
4. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1166-1168 (2006) and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2006)).
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onto reservations;5 as a result, domestic violence against Indian
women has reached epidemic levels in Indian country, with many of
the abusers identified as non-Indians.6 In recognition of these
challenges, some tribes are proactively seeking expansion of their
criminal jurisdiction, probing gray areas of Oliphant and seeking
sovereignty in its ambiguity.7
Recently, in the case of In re Russell,8 the Cherokee Tribal Court
confronted the thorny issue of criminal contempt. The court ruled
that because all courts' criminal contempt powers are inherent, they
fall outside the scope of Oliphant.9 This Recent Development argues,
however, that while imprecise facets of Oliphant and contempt law
would make it appropriate for the Cherokee Tribal Court to claim
power over summary criminal contempt prosecutions of non-Indians
in some circumstances, the court's blanket decree that criminal
contempt is always within a tribal court's jurisdiction runs counter to
current law.
Part I presents the facts of the Cherokee Tribal Court's order in
In re Russell as the backdrop for a discussion of the interplay between
contempt law and tribal court jurisdiction. Part II provides a brief
overview of tribal criminal court jurisdiction under the Supreme
Court's ruling in Oliphant. Part III surveys the history of contempt
law, explaining the sometimes subtle differences between the types of
contempt proceedings and how they are jurisdictionally determinative
in tribal courts. Part IV applies the principles of Oliphant and
5. For instance, the Harrah's Cherokee Casino in North Carolina is visited by 3.6
million people each year. JAMES H. JOHNSON, JR. ET AL., FRANK HAWKINS KENAN INST.
OF PRIVATE ENTER., ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
HARRAH'S CHEROKEE CASINO, NORTH CAROLINA ii (2011), available at http://www
.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/-/media/Files/kenaninstitute/UNCKenanlnstitute
_Cherokee.ashx.
6. In 2010, Congress found that "domestic and sexual violence against American
Indian and Alaska Native women has reached epidemic proportions" and that 39% of
American Indian and Alaska Native women will be subjected to domestic violence during
their lifetimes. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a)(5)(A),
(C), 124 Stat. 2258, 2262. According to another recent study, 66% of Indians who are
victims of violent crime identify their attacker as non-Indian. See Samuel E. Ennis,
Comment, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Argument
for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553, 567 (2009).
7. See Hallie Bongar White, Kelly Gaines Stoner & The Honorable James G. White,
Creative Civil Remedies Against Non-Indian Offenders in Indian Country, 44 TULSA L.
REV. 427, 427, 440-45 (2008) ("Lack of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians often
dictates that tribes must look to new and innovative civil legal strategies to address safety
and security for their citizens and members, residents, and visitors.").
8. No. SC-11-1 (N.C. Cherokee Ct. Aug. 15, 2011), available at http://turtletalk.files
.wordpress.com/20t1/08/in-re-russell.pdf.
9. See id. at 4.
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contempt law to In re Russell, explaining why the Cherokee Tribal
Court stepped beyond its jurisdictional limitations in the case. Part IV
concludes by setting forth ways in which tribal courts can, consistent
with Oliphant, enforce their authority through their contempt powers.
I. IN RE RUSSELL
The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians ("EBCI") has
approximately 14,500 members, mostly descendants of those who
avoided being forced on the Trail of Tears in the early nineteenth
century.1 The tribe is located on the 56,000-acre Qualla Boundary, a
land trust located in several counties in North Carolina's western
tip.1 Though not an enrolled member of the tribe,12 Dawn Russell
has immersed herself in the community. She performed as an "Eagle
Dancer" in a 2009 production of the outdoor drama Unto These Hills
on the reservation,13 organized a 2010 community forum meeting on
tribal legal issues,14 and, at the time of writing, managed a Family
Dollar store on the Qualla Boundary in Cherokee, North Carolina.
While working at the Family Dollar Store on November 10, 2010,
Russell became suspicious of two women in her store."1 She watched
as they meandered through the aisles with an empty shopping cart
and left without making a purchase.16 As they exited, Russell
observed that the women's purses, which had been empty when they
entered the store, were bulging. 7 After watching the women put
10. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 5, at Introduction.
11. Id.
12. In the EBCI, all direct lineal descendants of those whose names appear on the
1924 Baker Roll of tribal membership and who possess at least 1/16 Eastern Cherokee
blood are eligible for enrollment. See CHEROKEE CODE § 49 (2010), available at http://
www.narf.org/nill/Codes/ebcicode/49enrollment.pdf. Dual enrollment with other tribes is
not allowed. §§ 49-2(c), 49-3. Those who feel they meet the requirements for enrollment in
the tribe may submit an application to the EBCI's six-member Enrollment Committee,
which rules as to whether the applicant has the qualifications for enrollment. § 49-4.
13. 2009 Cast and Crew, CHEROKEE, N.C., http://www.cherokee-nc.com/index.php
?page=295 (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
14. Ironically, the year before the Cherokee Tribal Court held her in contempt,
Russell helped organize a community forum on "Tribal Law and Jurisdiction." See Scott
McKie, Tribal Jurisdiction Discussed in Forum, CHEROKEE ONE FEATHER, March 25,
2010, at 4, available at http://www.nc-cherokee.com/theonefeather/files/2011/01/March-25
.pdf. At the forum, Russell asked the forum's six-person panel of lawyers, law
enforcement officials, and community members, "Can you prosecute non-enrolled
members in Tribal Court?" Id.
15. Criminal Complaint at 2, E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Hernandez, No. CR 10-
1428 (N.C. Cherokee Ct. June 29, 2011) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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items into their truck and walk to another store in the shopping
center, Russell called the Cherokee Tribal Police.18
Russell filed a complaint in Cherokee Tribal Court, alleging that
the two women, Loreina Hernandez and Krystal Watty, shoplifted
approximately twenty-one dollars worth of merchandise from Family
Dollar. 9 As courts nationwide are increasingly doing in cases
involving misdemeanor or "low impact" crimes,2" Cherokee Tribal
Court Judge Saunooke ordered the case to mediation on February 9,
2011.21 When a worker from Mountain Mediation Services contacted
Russell to arrange the mediation, "Russell was belligerent,
uncooperative, and insulted Judge Saunooke. ' ' 22 Russell promised she
would contact her district manager regarding the mediation and then
call back, but she did not.23 On February 28, Mountain Mediation
Services mailed a letter to Russell informing her that her case was
being referred back to court because of her refusal to cooperate with
the mediation and that her court date was March 30. Russell did not
respond to the letter, and was ordered to appear in Cherokee Tribal
Court on June 29 to face criminal contempt charges.24 Hernandez and
Watty were sentenced on their larceny charges in Cherokee Tribal
Court on April 13,25 and Russell was sentenced to one day in jail and
given a $250 fine on June 29.26
At her hearing, "[tihe parties stipulated that, for the purposes of
this hearing, [Russell] was a non-Indian person. ' 27 She was given full
criminal process, and moved to dismiss the contempt citation, arguing
18. Id.
19. Criminal Complaint at 2, E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Watty, No. CR 10-1429
(N.C. Cherokee Ct. Apr. 13, 2011) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
20. See Larysa Simms, Note, Criminal Mediation Is the BASF of the Criminal Justice
System: Not Replacing Traditional Criminal Judicial Adjudication, Just Making It Better, 22
OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 797, 802-05 (2007). Simms notes that the use of mediation
as a remedy in criminal cases has increased dramatically in recent years because "minor
crimes mediation reduces the prosecutorial and court caseload of low-impact crimes that
are serious enough to warrant state intervention, thereby saving time, court resources, and
tax dollars.... [M]ediation alleviates overcrowded criminal dockets while effectively
addressing the issues underlying minor crimes." Id. at 803-05 (footnote omitted).
21. See In re Russell, No. SC-11-1, slip op. at 1 (N.C. Cherokee Ct. Aug. 15, 2011),
available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/in-re-russell.pdf.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2.
25. E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Hernandez, No. CR 10-1428 (N.C. Cherokee Ct.
Apr. 13, 2011) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); E. Band of Cherokee
Indians v. Watty, No. CR 10-1429 (N.C. Cherokee Ct. Apr. 13, 2011) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
26. Russell, slip op. at 5.
27. Id. at 1.
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that, as a non-Indian, she is not subject to criminal jurisdiction in
tribal court under Oliphant.21 Cherokee Tribal Court Judge Martin
rejected her argument, ruling that because contempt is not a "crime"
in the traditional sense and because contempt powers are inherent
and necessary for the maintenance of a judicial system's integrity,
Oliphant does not extend to contempt. 9
II. TRIBAL COURT CRIMINAL JURISDICTION UNDER OLIPHANT
Due to the complex tripartite balance of power among state,
federal, and tribal authorities, commentators often refer to
jurisdiction in Indian country as a "jurisdictional maze."3 Criminal
jurisdiction in tribal court hinges on labyrinthine tests controlling
which court (state, federal, or tribal) has jurisdiction over which
ethnic group (Indian or non-Indian) for the prosecution of which
crimes.31 As far as tribal courts are concerned, the threshold issue for
entering the jurisdictional maze is the race of the accused. If the
defendant is not Indian, the Supreme Court's ruling in Oliphant
prevents prosecution.
Oliphant involved a sequence of events stemming from the
Suquamish Indian Tribe's efforts to assert its sovereignty on the Port
Madison Reservation. 2 In the 1855 Treaty of Point Elliott, "the
Suquamish Indian Tribe relinquished all rights it might have had in
the lands of the State of Washington and agreed to settle" on a 7,276-
acre reservation across the Puget Sound from Seattle.33 By the 1970s,
the reservation had become "a checkerboard" of tribal lands and
property held in fee simple by non-Indians with roads maintained by
28. Id. at 2.
29. Id. at 4.
30. See, e.g., DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 483 (6th ed. 2011) ("The jurisdictional maze can be walked with some
confidence if a step-by-step approach is followed."); Robert N. Clinton, Criminal
Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIz. L.
REV. 503, 504 (1976) ("Jurisdiction over Indian land is often complicated by the conflicting
claims of three sovereigns to law enforcement authority.").
31. See generally WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL
153-80 (4th ed. 2004) (describing which crimes may be tried in Indian tribunals, which
ethnic groups are subject to Indian tribunals, and which court has jurisdiction in each
instance). In general, and with some exceptions, state courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes by non-Indians against non-Indians on reservations, federal courts have
jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians against Indians and "major" crimes committed by
Indians, and tribal courts have jurisdiction over minor crimes committed by Indians. See
id. at 181.
32. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 (1978).
33. Id. at 192-93.
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Kitsap County.34 Approximately fifty members of the Suquamish
Indian Tribe still lived on the reservation, along with 2,928 non-
Indians.3" In 1973, the Suquamish adopted a Law and Order Code
that gave the tribe criminal jurisdiction over both Indians and non-
Indians.36
Soon after the passage of the Law and Order Code, Mark
Oliphant assaulted a tribal police officer at 4:30 a.m. while drunk at
the Suquamish tribe's Chief Seattle Day festival.3 7 He was charged
with assault and resisting arrest.38 Later that year, Daniel Belgrade,
who would become Oliphant's fellow petitioner, led tribal authorities
on a high-speed chase through the reservation that ended when he
crashed into a tribal police vehicle.3 9 The incident resulted in the
Suquamish Tribe charging Belgrade with reckless endangerment and
injuring tribal property. a
Both men applied for writs of habeas corpus, arguing that the
Suquamish Indian Provisional Court did not have criminal
jurisdiction over them because they were non-Indians.4 1 Although
Oliphant and Belgrade were unsuccessful in the lower courts, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and decreed that tribal courts do
not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.42
According to Justice Rehnquist's opinion, an examination of
various historical sources indicates a longstanding "unspoken
assumption" that Indian tribes can only prosecute other Indians. 43
The Court recognized that procedural guarantees in the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 and other factors had caused tribal courts to
"resemble in many respects their state counterparts," 44 but the Court
also turned on its head the 1883 case, Ex parte Crow Dog,4 which
held that Indians should be tried according to their own "customs and
34. Id. at 193.
35. Id. at 193 n.1.
36. Id. at 193.
37. Sarah Krakoff, Mark the Plumber v. Tribal Empire, or Non-Indian Anxiety v.
Tribal Sovereignty? The Story of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, in INDIAN LAW
STORIEs 270 (Carole Goldbert et al. eds., 2011).
38. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
39. See Krakoff, supra note 37, at 271. Interestingly, one of Belgrade's passengers
during the chase was Mark Oliphant. Id.
40. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 194-95.
43. See id. at 198-206.
44. Id. at 211-12.
45. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
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procedure."46 Finally, the Court held that "[b]y submitting to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian Tribes necessarily
gave up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States
except in a manner acceptable to Congress."47
The Court's opinion in Oliphant-especially the validity of the
evidence backing the unspoken assumption theory-has been widely
criticized.48  In effect, Justice Rehnquist's dubious historical
interpretation of implicit limitations to tribal courts' territorial
authority took an axe to Indian tribes' retained sovereignty.49 The
stump of sovereignty remaining was further whittled away twelve
years later in Duro v. Reina,0 when the Supreme Court ruled that
individual tribal courts lack jurisdiction over Indians who are not
enrolled in their tribes." Fortunately for tribes, Congress abrogated
that decision with what is commonly called the "Duro Fix,"5 2 whereby
Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act's definition of
"powers of self-government" to include the "exercise [of] criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians."53 Although Duro's central holding is no
longer pertinent, dicta from the opinion adequately sums up what was
46. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211. In Exparte Crow Dog, a Sioux man killed a member of
his own tribe and was tried by the tribal council. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. The Supreme
Court ruled that it would be inappropriate for a federal court to also exercise jurisdiction
over the matter because the federal court would try the man in a manner contrary to the
customs of his people and "according to the law of a social state of which [he has] an
imperfect conception." Id. at 571. Congress quickly abrogated the decision by passing the
Major Crimes Act two years later, giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over specific
crimes committed on Indian reservations, including murder. See Major Crimes Act, ch.
341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)).
47. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
48. See, e.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal:
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609,
610 (1979) ("A close examination of the court's opinion reveals a carelessness with history,
logic, precedent, and statutory construction that is not ordinarily acceptable from so
august a tribunal."); Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme Court's
(Re) Construction of the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623, 631 (2011) ("In light of the
Indian canons' clear directive for interpreting historical sources, Justice Rehnquist's
treatment of this material verges on fraudulence.").
49. See, e.g., Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole Is Greater
than the Sum of the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 393 (1993) ("Since 1977, the United
States Supreme Court has embarked on a course that has virtually eviscerated the
sovereignty of Indian tribes.").
50. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
51. Id. at 693 ("A tribe's additional authority comes from the consent of its members,
and so in the criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal authority.").
52. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Cordiano, Note, Unspoken Assumptions: Examining Tribal
Jurisdiction over Nonmembers Nearly Two Decades After Duro v. Reina, 41 CONN. L.
REV. 265,268 (2008).
53. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006).
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taken from tribes in Oliphant: "A basic attribute of full territorial
sovereignty is the power to enforce laws against all who come within
the sovereign's territory, whether citizens or aliens. Oliphant
recognized that the tribes no longer can be described as sovereigns in
this sense."54 Instead, thanks to the unspoken assumption theory,
tribes are sovereign subject to the mandates of Congress and what
can be inferred through its inaction, retaining only what is expressly
authorized by legislation.55
III. A SURVEY OF CONTEMPT LAW, AND ITS RELATION TO
OLIPHANT
A. Inherency of the Contempt Powers
Dawn Russell's criminal contempt conviction hinged on the
Cherokee Tribal Court's conclusion that criminal contempt powers
are inherent and, as such, are not diminished by Oliphant. It has long
been accepted that the power to punish contempt--defined as "an act
of disobedience or disrespect toward a judicial or legislative body of
government ' 5 -is "inherent in all courts" because "its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to
the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts."57
While inherent, contempt powers are not limitless. The potential
for abuse of discretion is also inherent in the judiciary and is
especially present in the context of punishing contemnors.58 Because
contempts "often [strike] at the most vulnerable and human qualities
of a judge's temperament"5 9 and contempt proceedings can "leave the
offended judge solely responsible for identifying, prosecuting,
54. Duro, 495 U.S. at 685.
55. See Geoffrey C. Heisey, Comment, Oliphant and Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over
Non-Indians: Asserting Congress's Plenary Power To Restore Territorial Jurisdiction, 73
IND. L.J. 1051, 1063 (1998) (noting that while historically tribes could only be divested of
their territorial sovereignty by express congressional action, Oliphant allows sovereignty
to be taken away if a court finds implicit congressional intent to do so).
56. RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 1 (1963).
57. Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505,510 (1873).
58. See, e.g., Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888) ("[A]lthough arbitrary in its
nature and liable to abuse," the contempt power is nonetheless "absolutely essential to the
protection of the courts."); Paul A. Grote, Note, Purging Contempt: Eliminating the
Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2011)
("The potential for abuse of the contempt power is readily apparent.").
59. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,202 (1968).
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adjudicating, and sanctioning the contumacious conduct,"6 ° the
contempt power "uniquely is liable to abuse."6
These concerns are not recent phenomena; rather, courts and
Congress have attempted to curb these "inherent" contempt powers
for centuries. For example, in Ex parte Robinson6 2 the Supreme Court
ruled that because the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited the types of
punishments available in contempt cases to fines and jail time,
disbarment was an abuse of the contempt power.63 In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Field's majority opinion held that while "[t]he
power to punish for contempts is inherent," it is not an unbridled
grant of authority and can be limited and defined by acts of
Congress.64
B. Classifications of Contempt
In an effort to curb abuse of discretion, contempt law is divided
into criminal and civil contempt, and each of those categories is
further subdivided into "direct" and "indirect" contempt. 65 The
difference between civil and criminal contempt is nebulous, and
courts often apply the wrong label to their contempt orders.66 Some
confusion stems from the fact that whether contempt is civil or
criminal has no relation to whether the underlying litigation is civil or
criminal.67 As a result, acts in criminal proceedings can lead to
participants being held in civil contempt, 8 and civil trials can produce
60. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821,831 (1994).
61. See id. (noting that contempt power's "fusion of legislative, executive, and judicial
powers 'summons forth ... the prospect of "the most tyrannical licentiousness"'"
(quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 822 (1987))).
62. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873).
63. Id. at 512.
64. Id. at 510.
65. See Grote, supra note 58, at 1248.
66. See Wayne R. Johnson, Note, North Dakota's New Contempt Law: Will It Mean
Order in the Court?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 1027,1037 (1994).
67. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 792-93
(1987) (involving violators of an injunction prosecuted and found guilty of criminal
contempt); Stilley v. Fort Smith Sch. Dist., 238 S.W.3d 902, 911 (Ark. 2006) ("In
determining whether a particular action by a judge constitutes criminal or civil contempt,
the focus is on the character of relief rather than the nature of the proceeding." (citations
omitted)).
68. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 365 (1966) (holding that two-year jail
terms imposed on men who refused to testify in front of a grand jury under the Narcotics
Control Act of 1956 constituted civil remedies due to the "conditional nature" of the
sentences, which could be purged if the men testified).
2012] 1197
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criminal contempt prosecutions. 69 Furthermore, trial courts often look
to statutes that separately define the disobedient acts constituting
civil and criminal contempt when deciding whether to hold somebody
in civil or criminal contempt, but reviewing courts do not actually
define contempt by whether the trial court termed their proceeding as
being for civil or criminal contempt. Instead, appellate courts classify
a contempt as civil or criminal based on the nature of the sentence
imposed on the contemnor, regardless of the label given to the
sentence in the lower court.70
It is sometimes difficult to discern what "type" of action the court
has taken. As a general rule, civil contemnors are punished in a
remedial nature, intended to coerce them into doing something they
had refused to do,7 while criminal contempt involves a punitive
sanction.72 These principles seem basic but are complicated by
corollary penalties designed to coerce and punitive measures that
have the side effect of coercing future adherence to a court's
authority.73 Consider the following anecdote from the "Philosophy of
Law" chapter of the New York Times best-selling book Plato and a
Platypus Walk into a Bar .... 74 in which Thomas Cathcart and Daniel
Klein use jokes to illustrate basic philosophical concepts:
A man waits all day in traffic court for his case to be
heard. At long last it's his turn to stand before the judge,
but the judge only tells him he will have to come back
tomorrow, as court is being adjourned for the day. In
exasperation, the man snaps, "What the Hell for?"
The judge snaps back, "Twenty dollars for contempt
of court!"
The man pulls out his wallet. The judge says, "You
don't have to pay today."
69. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 641 (1988) (remanding a contempt conviction
for failure to pay child support so that the lower courts could determine whether the
defendant had been held in civil or criminal contempt).
70. See, e.g., id. at 631 ("[T]he labels affixed either to the proceeding or to the relief
imposed ... are not controlling."); Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 369 ("The fact that both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals called petitioners' conduct 'criminal contempt'
does not disturb our conclusion" that the contempt was actually civil).
71. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911) (noting that a
civil contemnor can "discharge himself at any moment by doing what he had previously
refused to do").
72. See id. at 443.
73. Id. ("It is true that either form of imprisonment has also an incidental effect.").
74. THOMAS CATHCART & DANIEL KLEIN, PLATO AND A PLATYPUS WALK INTO A
BAR ... : UNDERSTANDING PHILOSOPHY THROUGH JOKES (Penguin Books 2008)
(2006).
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The man says, "I'm just checking to see if I have
enough for two more words." 5
The book is not exactly a dense philosophical treatise, but the
joke effectively explains the overlaps between the types of contempt.
The judge levied a fine directly following the man's courtroom
outburst, so the contempt sanction seems punitive in nature, which is
indicative of criminal contempt. But the fine also caused a pause
before further disturbance of the courtroom, a "remedial" effect
characteristic of civil contempt.
In response to this "characterization" problem, and since it is
important for courts "to understand in advance the tools that are
available to them in ensuring swift and certain compliance with valid
court orders,"76 reviewing courts do not attempt to discern the
subjective intent of a lower court judge. Instead, they focus on the
objective characteristics of a trial court order that create a "clear
dividing line" between sanctions that are primarily coercive and those
that are primarily punitive.77
The common catchphrase characterizing the remedial nature of
civil contempt is that the contemnors "carry the keys" to their jail
cell.7" Imprisonment is remedial if "the defendant stand[s] committed
unless and until he performs the affirmative act required by the
court's order,"79 and a fine is remedial if it is paid to the complainant
or if the defendant can avoid paying a fine to the court through an
affirmative act."° Alternatively, criminal contempt sanctions are those
in which "the disobedience is a thing accomplished" and the
punishment "cannot undo or remedy what has been done nor afford
any compensation for the pecuniary injury caused by the
disobedience."" Therefore, at the most basic level, civil contempt
involves punishment imposed until an act occurs, while criminal
75. Id. at 166-67.
76. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 636 (1988).
77. See id. at 636-37; see also Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966)
("The test may be stated as: what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by imposing
[this] sentence?" (emphasis added)).
78. See, e.g., Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442.
79. Id.; see also Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 365 (holding that two-year contempt sentences
accompanied by a purge clause allowing defendants to be released before their sentences
were completed if they agreed to answer questions posed to them by a grand jury
constituted civil contempt).
80. Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632.
81. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442.
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contempt entails punishment that is inflicted because an act
occurred.s2
The distinction between direct and indirect contempt is easier to
define. Direct contempts have long been identified as "those which
are committed within the presence of the court, while in session, or so
near to the court as to interrupt its proceedings," while indirect
contempts are those "arising from matters not transpiring in court,
but by refusing to comply with its orders and decrees which are to be
performed elsewhere." 3 For example, in the hypothetical scenario
presented in this Recent Development's Introduction, the brothers
committed indirect contempt by shirking their responsibilities under
money judgments entered against them. By contrast, they committed
direct contempt when they cursed the judges after being sentenced.
These four distinctions are important because they have a direct
impact on the due process rights of those charged with contempt.84
Few procedural protections are afforded civil contemnors because
those sanctions are seen as avoidable and remedial.85 Criminal
contempt, though, is "a crime in the ordinary sense,"" so those
charged with criminal contempt "are entitled to full criminal
process."" Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has provided that
summary prosecutions of direct criminal contempts constitute an
exception to this requirement because the defiant conduct occurred
82. See Grote, supra note 58, at 1258. Grote notes that one basic test applied by some
courts to classify contempt is that "[c]ivil contempt is prospective, while criminal contempt
is retrospective." Id. The distinction here may be best illustrated through a pop culture
example. On November 2, 2011, actress Lindsay Lohan was sentenced for violating the
terms of her probation by skipping therapy sessions and arriving late for community
service. Alan Duke, Lindsay Lohan Gets Jail Time for Probation Violations, CNN (Nov. 2,
2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-02/entertainment/showbiz-lohan-probation-hearing
1 necklace-theft-judge-stephanie-sautner-probation? s=PM:SHOWBIZ. Her sentence
included a 30-day jail term, plus an additional 270-day sentence that could be purged
through the completion of community service and psychotherapy. Id. In this instance, the
30-day sentence was considered criminal contempt, punishing her past violations, while
the 270-day sentence was considered civil contempt, coercing her compliance with court
stipulations in the future. Id. When she received the sentence, the judge told Lohan that
she was "putting the keys to the jail in the defendant's hands." Id.
83. STEWART RAPALJE, A TREATISE ON CONTEMPT INCLUDING CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL CONTEMPTS 26-27 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981) (1890).
84. See Grote, supra note 58, at 1280 ("The distinction between civil and criminal
contempt ... serves only to provide fewer rights to civil contemnors, even though there is
nothing substantively different about the conduct."); Johnson, supra note 66, at 1033.
85. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994).
86. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
87. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 833.
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before the court, and therefore, fewer safeguards are necessary in
order to secure an accurate factual finding.88
C. Oliphant, Contempt, and Indian Country
The application of these concepts to tribal courts is extremely
complex. On a purely theoretical level, Oliphant did not leave Indian
reservations as outposts for non-Indian outlaws,89 since non-Indians
are still accountable for their acts on the reservation in federal and
state courts.9" The same is not true for direct contempt.91 Even if a
state court had the resources and incentive to prosecute non-Indian
tribal court criminal contemnors, a longstanding principle of
contempt law is that "[n]o court can punish a contempt of another
court."92 For indirect contempts, though, courts can give full faith and
credit to orders of other courts, but the measures Congress has
crafted to achieve this purpose actually further impede tribal courts
seeking to enforce their authority.9 3 In the 2000 amendments to the
Violence Against Women Act,94  Congress decreed that any
protection order issued by a state, tribe, or territory will receive full
faith and credit by courts of other states, tribes, or territories, and that
courts and law enforcement must enforce those orders as if they were
the state, tribe, or territory that issued them.95 However, Congress
singled out tribal court jurisdiction, limiting their means of
enforcement of the Act to "civil contempt proceedings, exclusion of
88. Id. at 832.
89. Krakoff, supra note 37, at 284 ("In theory, Oliphant does not result in a legal
vacuum for criminal behavior by non-Indians in Indian country."). As a practical matter,
the "federal court system is far too encumbered to prosecute the numerous minor crimes
associated with life on the reservation," and "[s]tates receive little or no revenue from
tribal sources and are reluctant to allocate scarce funds to enforce tribal laws on the
reservation." Heisey, supra note 55, at 1054.
90. See Heisey, supra note 55, at 1053 ("Federal, state, and tribal courts claim varying
degrees of criminal jurisdiction based on different concepts of sovereignty.").
91. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 177.
92. RAPAUE, supra note 83, at 15 ("Notwithstanding the fact that contempts are
regarded as offences against the state [and] it would seem to follow that any tribunal
having criminal jurisdiction should have power to punish them when committed anywhere
within the territory over which that jurisdiction extends, yet it is a well-settled rule that
that court alone in which a contempt is committed, or whose order or authority is defied,
has power to punish it .... ").
93. See Melissa L. Tatum, Establishing Penalties for Violations of Protection Orders:
What Tribal Governments Need To Know, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, no. 1, 2003-2004 at
125,130.
94. Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 20, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
95. Id. §§ 1101(b), 1494.
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violators from Indian lands, and other appropriate mechanisms."96 By
specifically addressing civil remedies while omitting criminal
sanctions, 97 Congress seemingly reinforced the unspoken assumption
regarding criminal jurisdiction in tribal courts,98 thus preventing tribal
courts from exercising criminal contempt powers against non-Indians
as a general proposition.
Several commentators indicate (in language suggesting varying
levels of confidence) that tribal courts may retain sovereignty to use
criminal sanctions to summarily punish direct contempt by non-
Indians. 99 This assertion is based on the principle that contempt
powers are at their "pinnacle ... where contumacious conduct
threatens a court's immediate ability to conduct its proceedings." '
The Supreme Court has indicated that despite its label, criminal
contempt is only as "criminal" as the process it warrants, and
contemnors need not be afforded criminal process in summary
prosecutions of direct contempt.'' Still, for this theory to be legally
sound, Oliphant cannot stand for circumscription of criminal
punishment of non-Indians but rather for a ban on criminal process.
Such a conclusion is logical because most court remedies are punitive
to some degree. If tribal courts were prevented from using any
punitive measures against non-Indians, they would have essentially
no power over non-Indians at all, even in civil cases where their
jurisdiction over non-Indians has been upheld in certain
circumstances.0 2 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist specifically stated in
the conclusion of the Oliphant opinion that tribal courts "do not have
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e).
97. See Tatum, supra note 93, at 130.
98. See id. ("[I]t is only logical to conclude that Congress did not intend to alter the
existing rules for tribal criminal jurisdiction.").
99. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 177 ("One small area of criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians may survive Oliphant. It seems likely that a tribal court would still have
power to enforce decorum in its courtroom by the use of criminal contempt power against
disruptive non-Indians. The exercise of such power may be essential to the very existence
of a tribal court, and is therefore not inconsistent with the status of a tribe as a dependent
sovereign."); Klint A. Cowan, International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by
American Indian Tribes, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 1, 19 (2006) ("[T]ribal courts
potentially retain criminal contempt power over non-Indians."); White et al., supra note 7,
at 438-39 ("[A] tribal court judge could summarily (i.e., immediately) detain a non-Indian
contemnor to preserve the safety, integrity, and order of the court.").
100. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 832 (1994).
101. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
102. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (holding that tribes retain
civil jurisdiction "over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe").
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inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians" in the absence
of congressional grant. 103 That language could be interpreted to
indicate that the power to try non-Indians and the power to punish
them are severable concepts, with punishment only barred if
following a criminal trial. Furthermore, because it is well-established
that even civil contempt remedies are somewhat punitive,1"
Congress's authorization of tribal courts' use of civil contempt powers
on non-Indians demonstrates that Congress is tolerant of tribal
courts' punishment of non-Indians, as long as it occurs separately
from criminal prosecution of them. Therefore, it should be
unequivocally accepted that summary prosecution of direct criminal
contempt in tribal courts is appropriate, regardless of who is being
punished. Under this rule, if Dawn Russell had insulted Judge
Saunooke during Hernandez and Watty's larceny proceedings instead
of over the phone several days later, a summary proceeding for
criminal contempt would have been appropriate. Because her
contemptuous act occurred out of court, though, and Russell had to
be afforded full criminal process, a different analytical framework for
the tribal court's powers applies.
IV. MEANS BY WHICH TRIBAL COURTS CAN VINDICATE THEIR
AUTHORITY
A. The Outer Limits of Quasi-Sovereignty
In Oliphant, the Court noted that Congress should weigh the
competency of tribal courts and the prevalence of crime by non-
Indians on reservations in the future when deciding if it is appropriate
to grant criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to tribal courts.0 5
Given the difficulties federal and state authorities have policing
reservations, the shifting realities of reservation economies and
demographics in the wake of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, as
well as the due process protections secured to tribal court defendants
103. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). In the preceding
sentence, Justice Rehnquist lent additional credence to the notion that Oliphant deals with
criminal trials separate from punishment of non-Indians by only mentioning criminal trials
when discussing the process for potential restoration of sovereignty to tribes. See id.
("[T]hese are considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian tribes
should finally be authorized to try non-Indians.").
104. See, e.g., Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 635 (1988) ("In contempt cases, both civil
and criminal relief have aspects that can be seen as either remedial or punitive or both
105. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211-12.
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by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, many commentators have
suggested it is time to do so.106
But while the EBCI waits for that congressional grant of power,
it has unearthed potsherds of sovereignty left in the crevices of the
Oliphant decision. Under the EBCI's tribal code, "[t]he Judicial
Branch shall not have jurisdiction over matters in which the exercise
of jurisdiction has been specifically prohibited by a binding decision of
the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit or by an Act of Congress." ' 7 The
tribal code gives the tribal court some room to be creative, as it does
not seem to acknowledge any "unspoken assumptions"' 08 regarding
the court's power. As a result, the tribal court must abstain from
exercising its jurisdiction only where doing so has been expressly
precluded.
One of the EBCI's most empowering interpretations of the scope
of its authority under the statute is that the tribe views Oliphant as
applicable only to citizens of the United States. In 2005, the Cherokee
Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld a decision by the Cherokee
Tribal Court to exercise criminal jurisdiction over a Mexican citizen
who committed second-degree child abuse while living with a
Cherokee woman on the Qualla Boundary.109 Relying on Oliphant,
the appellant challenged his prosecution, but the Cherokee Supreme
Court held that "[in nine separate places in the majority opinion in
Oliphant, Justice ... Rehnquist refers to 'non-Indian citizens of the
United States' "; because Justice Rehnquist never addressed the issue
of non-citizens of the United States directly,110 the tribe's exercise of
jurisdiction was proper."
The EBCI's statutory definition of who is "Indian" also expands
the breadth of the tribal court's criminal jurisdiction to include some
106. See, e.g., Ennis, supra note 6, at 572 ("For these reasons, Congress should
abrogate the Oliphant decision and reaffirm inherent tribal jurisdiction over reservation
crimes."); Marie Quasius, Note, Native American Rape Victims: Desperately Seeking an
Oliphant Fix, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1902, 1925 (2009) (arguing that because of sexual violence
problems on Indian reservations, the Indian Civil Rights Act "must be amended, as it was
for the Duro-fix, to include 'all persons,' " which "would enable tribes to extend their
criminal jurisdiction to include non-Indians").
107. CHEROKEE CODE § 7-2(c) (2010) (emphasis added), available at http://www.narf
.org/nill/Codes/ebcicode/7judicial.pdf.
108. See supra Part II.
109. See E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, No. CR 03-1443, 2005 N.C. Cherokee
Sup. Ct. LEXIS 6, at *18 (N.C. Cherokee Sup. Ct. Apr. 12,2005).
110. Id. at *7-8 (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-11).
111. Id.
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people who are not technically members of any tribe.11 2 Federal
courts generally use a two-pronged analysis to determine Indian
status, looking to whether the defendant has "some Indian blood"
and is recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government.113
The "recognition" prong of this test is open to various interpretations,
and some federal courts have ruled that "recognized" does not
necessarily mean enrolled.114 EBCI magistrates use a test under which
members of federally recognized tribes and EBCI "first descendants"
(those who have a parent who is a tribal member but who do not have
the requisite blood quantum for membership) are automatically
considered Indians for the purposes of the court system." 5 However,
under the EBCI test, a member of a state-recognized tribe or a person
who "holds [him or] herself out as an Indian" can also be considered
Indian at the discretion of the magistrate. 116
The EBCI also interprets Oliphant's proscription of "criminal
jurisdiction" as pertaining to personal jurisdiction over non-Indian
defendants, rather than subject matter jurisdiction over criminal
matters involving non-Indian perpetrators. 17 Because personal
112. See N.C. CHEROKEE R. CRIM. P. 6(b)(1), available at http://www.narf.org/nill
/Codes/ebcicode/l15criminalpro.pdf.
113. See United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he generally
accepted test ... asks whether the defendant (1) has some Indian blood, and (2) is
recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government or both."), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 2364 (2010); see also United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005)
(stating that courts generally rely on the two-prong Stymiest test to determine Indian
status); Weston Meyring, "I'm an Indian Outlaw, Half Cherokee and Choctaw": Criminal
Jurisdiction and the Question of Indian Status, 67 MONT. L. REV. 177, 186 (2006)
(describing the prevalence of the two-prong test).
114. See Meyring, supra note 113, at 193-207 (attempting to identify and explain the
"various methods adopted by courts in construing the meaning of recognition"). Under
the prominent "St. Cloud Test," laid out by a South Dakota federal court in 1988,
"recognition" should be guided by weighing four factors. St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.
Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988). The court acknowledged that "a person may still be an
Indian though not enrolled with a recognized tribe" and ruled that
[i]n declining order of importance, these factors [to determine 'recognition'] are:
1) enrollment in a tribe; 2) government recognition formally and informally
through providing the person assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) enjoying
benefits of tribal affiliation; and 4) social recognition as an Indian through living
on a reservation and participating in Indian social life.
Id.
115. See N.C. CHEROKEE R. CRIM. P. 6(b)(1)(B), available at http://www.narf.org/nill
/Codes/ebcicode/15criminalpro.pdf.
116. See id. at6(b)(1)(E).
117. See id. at 6(b)(2).
/Codes/ebcicode/15criminalpro.pdf ("A non-Indian may waive the issue of personal
jurisdiction and consent to proceeding in the Cherokee Court."). But see 2 CARRIE E.
GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 99 (2004)
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jurisdiction is waivable but subject matter jurisdiction is not, the
EBCI's stance allows non-Indian defendants to consent to a
proceeding in Cherokee Tribal Court." 8  Finally, since a
"nonmember's presence and conduct on Indian lands are conditioned
by the limitations a tribe may choose to impose,"11 9 there are civil
remedies-most notably banishment from the reservation-uniquely
available to the EBCI and other tribes that can be used to punish
those who cannot be brought to tribal criminal court.2 °
B. In re Russell and the Limits of Contempt's Inherency
Dawn Russell was prosecuted for an indirect contempt because
her actions occurred away from the court. The Cherokee Tribal Court
imposed a criminal sanction because Russell's sentence could not be
purged through compliance with the tribal court's mediation order
and, therefore, was primarily punitive in nature. The crux of the
Cherokee Tribal Court's reasoning for having the power to punish
Russell in this manner was that "[tihe inherent power of the Court to
punish contempt is separate and distinct from the power of the Court
to adjudicate criminal cases in which the EBCI alleges that a
particular defendant has violated the law."'' Through this language,
the Cherokee Tribal Court attempted another creative circumvention
of Oliphant, but in doing so turned a blind eye to multiple Supreme
Court decisions speaking directly to the nature of criminal contempt
as an offense.
The tribal court's conclusion relies on language from the 1895
case In re Debs,'22 which states that "[i]n order that a court may
compel obedience to its orders it must have the right to inquire
whether there has been any disobedience thereof." 123 However, the
tribal court took this language out of context. The Debs decision
stated that criminal procedure protections are unwarranted in
contempt proceedings, 124 with an argument predicated on the
(warning that this interpretation of Oliphant is "controversial" and that "it may be
unlikely that a federal court would uphold the idea of criminal jurisdiction" through
consent).
118. N.C. CHEROKEE R. CRIM. P. 6(b)(2), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes
/ebcicode/15criminalpro.pdf.
119. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147 (1982).
120. See White et al., supra note 7, at 440-45.
121. In re Russell, No. SC-11-1, slip op. at 4 (N.C. Cherokee Ct. Aug. 15, 2011),
available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/in-re-russell.pdf.
122. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
123. Russell, slip op. at 4 (quoting Debs, 158 U.S. at 595).
124. Debs, 158 U.S. at 594.
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principle that contempt is not a crime. 12 The Supreme Court
renounced that interpretation in Bloom v. Illinois,126  which
"specifically rejected Debs' rationale that courts must have self-
contained power to punish disobedience of their judgments."' 127 After
Bloom, criminal contemnors are treated no differently from other
criminal defendants, since "convictions for criminal contempt are
indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, for their impact
on the individual defendant is the same.
128
One of the few federal court cases dealing with contempt powers
in tribal courts took this stance when discussing whether a Cherokee
woman could be held in contempt in a Ute Indian court.1 29 The
distinction between civil and criminal contempt was not essential to
the court's ruling because the defendant had not exhausted all tribal
court remedies. 3 ' But the decision pointed out that if the contempt
was considered criminal, the Ute court still could punish the
Cherokee woman despite Duro's divestiture of tribal courts' criminal
jurisdiction over non-tribe member Indians because of the Duro
Fix."' The court's logic features an implicit recognition of the
inherent limitations of contempt powers and the necessity for
conferred jurisdiction to punish criminal contempt in tribal court.
The Cherokee Tribal Court's other rationale for its decision is
that "[t]he Supreme Court has never expanded Oliphant into the
contempt arena, and nor would such an expansion be expected.'
132
While the Supreme Court may not have directly tackled the contempt
issue, the 2000 amendments to the Violence Against Women Act
expanded Oliphant to cover criminal contempt of court through the
type of "unspoken assumption" that served as the foundation of
Oliphant.'33 The contrary construction of Oliphant suggested by the
tribal court in In re Russell is far too narrow, reducing the Supreme
Court's ruling to a bright-line procedural rule rather than a complex
concept of sovereignty.
125. Id. at 596.
126. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
127. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 823 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
128. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201.
129. See Lyda v. Tah-Bone, 962 F. Supp. 1434 (D. Utah 1997).
130. Id. at 1435.
131. Id.; see supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
132. In re Russell, No. SC-11-1, slip op. at 4 (N.C. Cherokee Ct. Aug. 15, 2011),
available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/in-re-russell.pdf.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
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The Cherokee Tribal Court seemed to take exception with the
fact that Russell had only come before the court in the first place
because she filed a criminal complaint in the court, and emphasized
that "[i]t would be a curious result indeed if a non-Indian person
could initiate the finding of probable cause on a criminal defendant
and not be subject to the power and processes of the Court." '134
Apparently exasperated by the perceived unfairness and absurdity of
the situation, the court simply wrote, "[t]hat cannot be the law,"'35
with no other explanation as to why it could not be. The concept that
somebody could initiate an action in a court and then abandon it at
his whim is indeed counterintuitive, but the EBCI might not have
been as helpless as the tribal court's opinion lets on. The Supreme
Court has held that a "judge should resort to criminal sanctions only
after he determines, for good reason, that the civil remedy would be
inappropriate."'36 It became clear to the Cherokee Tribal Court
sometime between February 28 and March 30 that Russell would not
comply with the mediation order.'37 The court did not sentence the
shoplifters from Russell's store until April 13.138 Because the EBCI's
laws only require five days' notice prior to civil contempt
proceedings,139 the court had ample time prior to sentencing the
shoplifters to coerce Russell's compliance through remedial civil
contempt sanctions if mediation of this issue was of such importance
to the court.140
C. Alternative Means of Enforcing Authority
Advocates for change in tribal court jurisdiction favor one of two
avenues: the legislative branch or the judicial branch. Judge Martin,
who issued the In re Russell decision, has made it clear through his
legal scholarship that he believes Oliphant was an ill-informed
134. Russell, slip op. at 5.
135. Id.
136. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 n.9 (1966).
137. Russell, slip op. at 2.
138. Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 372. If mediation was of such importance to the court, it had
ample time prior to sentencing the shoplifters to coerce Russell's compliance through
remedial civil contempt sanctions. See CHEROKEE CODE § 1-27 (2010), available at http://
www.narf.org/nill/Codes/ebcicode/lcivilpro.pdf (authorizing imprisonment of those who
fail to comply with an order of the court as long as that person is able to comply with the
order and the purpose of the order "may still be served by compliance with the order").
139. See CHEROKEE CODE § 1-29(a) (2010), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes
/ebcicode/lcivilpro.pdf.
140. See id. § 1-27.
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decision that should be re-examined judicially. 4' In Judge Martin's
view, Justice Rehnquist relied on an assumption that had gone
unspoken because it did not exist, especially in relation to the
Cherokee, who exercised criminal jurisdiction with the government's
approval as far back as the 1820s. 14 2 Specifically, Judge Martin
believes that "[t]he following question should be presented to the
Supreme Court of the United States: Consistent with their dependent
status, do the Cherokee Indians retain the sovereign power, which
they previously exercised, to try and punish non-Indian citizens of the
United States for violations of their laws?"' 4 3 For this to happen, the
Cherokee Tribal Court would have to push the boundaries of its
criminal jurisdiction in hopes that a live controversy reaches the
Supreme Court on appeal.'"
There are critics of this approach who instead advocate for a
more conservative means for effecting change. First, some
commentators argue that to push the envelope risks cultivating
further disrespect for the reservation communities by those who see
them as operating beyond their lawful bounds.'45 This concept is
especially relevant to contempt, where respect forms the core of the
issue because, as the Supreme Court stated in one of its most
influential contempt cases, "[g]enuine respect, which alone can lend
true dignity to our judicial establishment, will be engendered ... by
the firm administration of the law through those institutionalized
procedures which have been worked out over the centuries." 146
Therefore, if a tribal court attempts to use its criminal contempt
powers to instill respect among non-Indians, the court's actions can
actually have the opposite effect. To complicate matters further, tribal
courts are already unfairly scrutinized as to their legitimacy.14' As a
141. See generally J. Matthew Martin, The Nature and Extent of the Exercise of
Criminal Jurisdiction by the Cherokee Supreme Court: 1823-1835, 32 N.C. CENT. L. REV.
27 (2009) (arguing for a re-evaluation of Oliphant's "bedrock assumptions" in light of the
historical record of the Cherokee Supreme Court).
142. Id. at 39.
143. Id. at 63.
144. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911) ("[T]he exercise of the
judicial power is limited to 'cases' and 'controversies.' Beyond this it does not extend, and
unless it is asserted in a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution, the
power to exercise it is nowhere conferred.").
145. See Heisey, supra note 55, at 1055 (arguing that tribal entities who use "self-help"
methods to "stem the tide of non-Indian offenders" are using tactics "repugnant to both
the interests of the United States and the tribal judicial systems, and can be highly
destructive to the local communities").
146. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,208 (1968).
147. See Ennis, supra note 6, at 589 ("Considering the opportunity for habeas review,
the safeguards inherent in the ICRA ... and the demonstrated reliability of tribal
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result, some argue that if they are ever to regain criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians through congressional grant, they must first erase
doubts regarding their overall fairness. 148 Under this view, tribal
courts should take a cautious stance in hopes that Congress will come
to view them as appropriate forums for all disputes and restore their
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in the near future.
This approach does not leave a court powerless to foster respect.
Tribal courts should take care to nest any punitive measures within
the civil remedies they impose on contemnors. For example, tribal
courts can incarcerate those who violate court orders by requiring
restitution, and imposing jail time as a means of coercing compliance
with the restitution. 149 In doing so, tribal court orders should
specifically state that the purpose of an incarceration is to encourage
compliance with a previously issued order and explain what the
contemnor must do to comply. 150
There is some evidence that the more cautious approach is
working. The Tribal Law and Order Act, passed in 2010, recognized
the domestic abuse and drug-related problems facing Indian Country
in its findings and took action to combat those issues.15 Still, the Act
also made it clear that "[n]othing in this Act confers on an Indian
tribe criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians." '152 However, a bill
introduced in the Senate by Hawaii Senator Daniel Akaka, the
SAVE Native Women Act, 153 goes much further. That bill would
allow tribes "special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction," which
can be exercised over those who violate domestic violence protective
orders if the victim is Indian.'54
Even with improvements to their situation potentially on the
horizon, it is understandable that anything less than the return of full
territorial jurisdiction is offensive to those tribes that had exercised
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians prior to 1978. And it is possible
that by exercising jurisdiction in borderline cases, like the Cherokee
Tribal Court did in In re Russell, the Supreme Court may someday
judiciaries, criticisms about fundamental tribal court fairness and competence appear
exaggerated at best.").
148. See Tatum, supra note 93, at 135 (stating that tribal courts must "reduce questions
about their authority to deal fairly with non-members," and that "[o]nly then will tribal
court[s] regain the jurisdiction so wrongfully limited by the Supreme Court").
149. White et al., supra note 7, at 441-42.
150. Id.
151. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261.
152. Id. § 206.
153. See SAVE Native Women Act, S. 1763, 112th Cong. (2011).
154. Id. § 204(b).
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revisit Oliphant.155 However, because the Cherokee Tribal Court's
ruling regarding Dawn Russell is based on overruled precedent, and
because the case can potentially be decided on procedural grounds
without addressing Oliphant, the Cherokee Supreme Court should
overrule the tribal court's decision before the case reaches the federal
courts.
CONCLUSION
If the Cherokee Tribal Court had attempted in In re Russell to
clarify the jurisdictional haze surrounding criminal contempt by
declaring that it could summarily punish a non-Indian contemnor for
a direct contempt, it would have been correct in elucidating a
previously unclear proposition. However, because that case involved
an indirect criminal contempt and the Cherokee Tribal Court failed
to acknowledge the ability of legislatures to limit the inherency of
contempt powers, the court went beyond what is permissible under
even a liberal reading of Oliphant. The inability of tribal courts to use
criminal contempt as a remedy against non-Indians is undoubtedly
troubling. However, until the tribal courts are conferred criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, they risk tainting their legitimacy if
they do not recognize the delineation between direct and indirect
contempt. In the absence of criminal jurisdiction, tribal courts must
be proactive in capitalizing on the effectual similarities of criminal
and civil contempt sanctions, tailoring contempt remedies to the
realities of Indian country, and including punitive sanctions within
remedial measures.
JOSEPH CHILTON
155. Professor Matthew L.M. Fletcher of Michigan State University College of Law has
noted that because of a continually shrinking docket size and other factors, it would
logically follow that the current Supreme Court "likely is not going to accept an appeal on
an Indian law matter unless there is a circuit split," yet "the Court always accepts more
Indian cases for review than the field would appear to justify." See Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
The Supreme Court's Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 604-05 (2008).
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